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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
At his sentencing hearing for DUI, the district court imposed a ten-year sentence 
with two years fixed, on Mr. Steelsmith, and retained jurisdiction. The district court also 
entered a restitution order. However, it did not impose any fines, costs, or driver's 
license suspension at that time, deciding that it wanted to wait to do so until after 
Mr. Steelsmith finished his rider. The district court remanded Mr. Steelsmith to the 
custody of the Department of Correction at the end of the sentencing hearing. 
When the district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction, it added the new, 
previously-unimposed punishments of a fine, court costs, and a driver's license 
suspension to Mr. Steelsmith's sentence. Mr. Steelsmith appealed, asserting that the 
district court did not have the authority (i.e., the jurisdiction) to impose those additional 
punishments when it relinquished jurisdiction and by doing so, it violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. He also argued that, in 
regard to the length of his sentence (both as initially imposed and after the denial of his 
I.C.R. Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion), the district court abused its discretion by 
not sufficiently considering the mitigating evidence present in his case. 
The State's responses to Mr. Steelsmith's arguments in that regard ignore 
well-established Idaho law. It attempts to argue that each individual punishment was 
analyzed as a separate aspect of sentencing, imposition of which could be individually 
delayed until after the period of retained jurisdiction. However, the Idaho appellate 
courts have clearly stated that the sentencing courts only have jurisdiction to impose a 
sentence, and that occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. Imposing 
1 
additional punishments at a second proceeding exceeds that authority and violates 
double jeopardy protections. The State also attempts to argue that because execution 
of a sentence subject to a period of retained jurisdiction is not effectuated until after 
relinquishment, the sentence was not actually executed before the period of retained 
jurisdiction. It makes this argument despite the fact that the Idaho appellate courts have 
clearly held that a sentence is executed when defendant is remanded to the custody of 
the Department of Correction. Furthermore, Idaho appellate courts have held that, in 
regard to periods of retained jurisdiction, if no action is taken by the district court, the 
defendant continues to serve his underlying sentence, indicating that the underlying 
sentence is in effect (i.e., executed) throughout the period of retained jurisdiction. 
As the State's responses in regard to the district court's jurisdiction and 
double jeopardy are directly contrary to established Idaho law, they do not discredit 
Mr. Steelsmith's arguments, nor do they demonstrate that the district court did not 
exceed its jurisdiction or violate the double jeopardy protections by imposing these 
additional punishments after the period of retained jurisdiction. Because of those errors, 
this Court should vacate the improperly-imposed punishments. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Steelsmith's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by imposing various punishments at the rider 
review hearing in violation of jurisdictional limitations and the state and federal 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction by 
not sufficiently considering the factors which indicated that Mr. Steelsmith would 
be able to succeed in a less structured environment. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Steelsmith's 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new evidence he 
presented .1 
1 In regard to Issues 2 and 3, the State's responses concerning the excessiveness 
of Mr. Steelsmith's sentence are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is 
necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly, Mr. Steelsmith simply refers the 
Court back to pages 18-33 of his Appellant's Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Imposing Various Punishments At The Rider Review 
Hearing In Violation Of Jurisdictional Limitations And The State And Federal 
Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the district court imposed a sentence, which included a period of 
retained jurisdiction, on Mr. Steelsmith following his plea of guilty to DUI. That sentence 
included a prison term and restitution, but did not include fines, costs, or a driver's 
license suspension. Instead, the district court decided it would not impose those 
punishments until after the period of retained jurisdiction. The district court then 
executed that sentence (consisting of a prison sentence and a restitution order) when it 
remanded Mr. Steelsmith to the custody of the county sheriff with orders to transport 
him forthwith to the custody of the board. When Mr. Steelsmith returned from his period 
of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and increased the 
sentence with the new, additional punishments it had not imposed at the sentencing 
hearing. In doing so, it not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also committed 
fundamental error, violating clearly on the record Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived federal and 
state constitutional protections from double jeopardy. 
The State attempts to justify the district court's actions by contending that they 
constituted individual aspects of sentencing or individual sentencing rulings, and as 
such, imposition and/or execution of each could be delayed until the end of the period of 
retained jurisdiction. As to double jeopardy, it contends that Mr. Steelsmith had not 
been in original jeopardy because he did not have "a legitimate expectation in the 
finality of his sentence." 
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The State's arguments on both fronts are untenable. Its arguments in regard to 
the district court's jurisdiction ignore the fundamental premise that sentencing only 
occurs once, at the sentencing hearing, and it is at that time that the entire sentence is 
imposed (i.e., all sentencing decisions are made) and that subsequent increases to that 
originally-imposed sentence are beyond the district court's jurisdiction. It also ignores 
the long-standing rule that a sentence is executed when the defendant is remanded to 
the custody of the board. Additionally, the State's arguments ignore the precedent 
which holds that a period of retained jurisdiction only grants the district court limited 
continuing jurisdiction, which is coextensive to that of the Department of Correction, 
and, as such, does not extend to allow for increases in the penalties originally imposed. 
For both of these reasons, the district court did not have the jurisdiction to 
impose new, additional punishments at a second hearing, which is precisely what it 
erroneously did in this case. Furthermore, the State's arguments in regard to double 
jeopardy ignore the Idaho precedent which clearly demonstrates that a sentence 
imposed prior to a period of retained jurisdiction is final, so much so that the defendant 
is able to appeal that sentence and he does not have a cognizable due process right to 
a hearing in regard to the potential relinquishment of jurisdiction and the resuming of 
that sentence. Therefore, Mr. Steelsmith did have a legitimate expectation in the finality 
of that sentence sufficient to support a double jeopardy claim. 
As none of the State's arguments are meritorious in regard to these issues, this 
Court should remedy the district court's erroneous actions by vacating these 
inappropriately-imposed additional punishments. 
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B. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Add Fines, Costs, And A Driver's 
License Suspension After The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction 
The State does not contest the fundamental premise that "a district court loses 
jurisdiction to modify or alter a sentence once that sentence has been imposed and 
executed.,,2 (See Resp. Br., p.5 (citing McFarland v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262, 266 
(1957); State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 585 (1980)).) "[A] sentence is imposed when 
initially pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4) or the 
sentence is suspended." (Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (quoting State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248, 
249 (Ct. App. 1998).) Despite recognizing this authority, the State attempts to argue 
that Mr. Steelsmith's sentence had not been imposed or executed (at least in regard to 
the fine, costs, and driver's license suspension). It is mistaken on both counts. 
1. As Established In Accordance With Precedent, Mr. Steelsmith's Entire 
Sentence Was Imposed At The Sentencing Hearing, And The Authority To 
Impose That Sentence Could Not Be Deferred To The Relinquishment 
Hearing 
The State disregards established precedent (i.e., McFarland, Johnson, and 
Alvarado) and argues that the district court could impose a sentence and increase it 
later by deferring "one or more aspects of a sentence" or "some of its sentencing 
rulings" to-wit, imposition of additional punishments. 3 (See Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) The 
2 To the extent that this is an argument about "the district court's jurisdiction," 
Mr. Steelsmith recognizes the difference between an entire lack of the overarching 
subject matter jurisdiction and a lack of authority to act in a certain way within that 
overarching subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2010). 
3 The State relies on the recitation of the facts in State v. Ward, 145 Idaho 68, 71 
(et. App. 2000), to support its premise that the district court can delay imposition of a 
sentence. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) However, in Ward, the district court delayed imposition 
of the entire sentence until after the defendant had been given a sufficient opportunity to 
argue that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. See Ward, 145 Idaho at 71. 
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State's position is contrary to established Idaho law, which provides that the district 
court's only opportunity to impose a sentence (i.e., make determinations about all 
aspects of the sentence or make all sentencing rulings) is at the sentencing hearing. 
See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
unambiguously stated that, when a sentence includes a period of retained jurisdiction, 
"[sJentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins, not when 
jurisdiction is relinquished." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court of Appeals 
has explicitly held that the established principle in Idaho is: "a sentence is imposed 
when initially pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4) 
or the sentence is suspended." Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249. To that end, "when, under 
a judgment, a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial court cannot amend 
or modify it, either during or after the term of court at which the sentence was 
pronounced, and that any attempt so to do is of no effect." McFarland, 79 Idaho at 266; 
but see State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the district 
court does have limited jurisdiction to modify an imposed sentence, but only insofar as 
to reduce that sentence pursuant to Rule 35; otherwise, it can only resume the original 
sentence, which impliedly was already imposed). As such, there is only one point at 
which the sentence, or any component, aspect, or ruling thereof, may be imposed - the 
sentencing hearing. Id. 
Once the district court had resolved the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, then it 
proceeded to impose the entire sentence. Id. As such, Ward does not stand for or 
support (or even discuss) the premise that the district court may bifurcate the imposition 
of sentence. See id. To the extent that the recitation of the procedural facts in Ward is 
precedential, it only recognizes that the district court may delay imposition of the entire 
sentence if it is necessary to resolve a pending motion. See id. 
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The State attempts to circumvent Coassolo's and Alvarado's clear holdings by 
arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court did not expressly say that a district could not 
defer a sentencing ruling until after the period of retained jurisdiction.4 (Resp. 
Br., pp.8-9.) Other than the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has actually forestalled 
that argument by holding that "sentencing" (i.e., the imposition of the entire sentence, 
and thus all components, aspects, or rulings thereof) does not occur at relinquishment, 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249, the State's inference, 
arising from the double negative ("the Idaho Supreme Court did not say we could not do 
this"), is wholly improper and contrary to the rest of Idaho law. See, e.g., McFarland, 79 
Idaho at 266; Johnson, 101 Idaho at 585; Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132 
Idaho at 249; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264. 
Further to that point, the statute under which Mr. Steelsmith was sentenced, 
I.C. § 18-8005(6) (R., p.61), has five components to the sentence that may be imposed 
4 To this end, the State argues that it is within the district court's inherent power to 
regulate its calendar to delay parts of its decisions to promote judicial efficiency 
(presumably reasoning that the district court is somehow being more efficient in 
resolving the case by not deciding all sentencing issues at one time, but instead, 
requiring a second hearing to finish up what should have been done at the first hearing). 
(See Resp. Br., p.8 (citing Oep't of Labor and Indus. Servo V. East Idaho Mills, Inc., 111 
Idaho 137, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1986).) However, the authority to which East Idaho Mifls 
refers arose under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16 governing pre-trial activities. East 
Idaho Milfs, 111 Idaho at 136-37. Even if a parallel could be drawn between the 
authority of the court in criminal, as opposed to civil, matters (for example, the 
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial could impact the district court's 
unfettered ability to control its calendar or do substantial justice in the case), the critical 
fact in Mr. Steelsmith's case is that it deals with a post-conviction issue, not a pre-trial 
issue. Thus, East Idaho Milfs is distinguishable and the rule articulated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Coassolo remains the only precedent on point: the district court's 
post-conviction authority to regulate its calendar is expressly limited. See Coassolo, 
136 Idaho at 142-43. The district court is only authorized to impose the sentence or 
make decisions regarding the aspects of sentencing, at the sentencing hearing, not 
after a period of retained jurisdiction. Id. 
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pursuant to a conviction or guilty plea under that statute. I.C. § 18-8005(6). As such, 
each is a part of the sentence for the identified offense, not a sentence unto itself, even 
though each constitutes a different punishment. See id. Therefore, since sentencing 
(i.e., the imposition of the sentence) occurs prior to the period of retained jurisdiction, 
all components or aspects of the sentence must necessarily be imposed at the 
sentencing hearing. 5 See Coasso/o, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249. 
Mr. Steelsmith's entire sentence was necessarily imposed at the sentencing hearing, 
and it did not include any fine, costs, or license suspension. See id. The district court 
was without jurisdiction to impose parts of that sentence at a later date. See id. 
Furthermore, as the Idaho Supreme Court held in Coasso/o, and as the Court of 
Appeals subsequently affirmed in Goodlett, the district court's authority at the 
relinquishment hearing was limited: at most, it could only resume that sentence which 
had been already imposed. 6 Coasso/o, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 
264; see also State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008) (holding, in the revocation of 
probation context, which is substantially similar to the relinquishment of jurisdiction, 
"upon revocation of the probation the court cannot resentence the defendant' (emphasis 
added)); State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (same). The district court's only 
5 Even if the State's perspective - that each aspect (fine, cost, and suspension) is an 
individual sentence - is appropriate, Coasso/o provides that the district court did not 
have the authority to impose those sentences at the relinquishment hearing, since 
sentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. Coasso/o, 136 
Idaho at 142-43. Therefore, even if the "multiple aspects of sentencing" perspective is 
correct, the district court still acted beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction by imposing 
those aspects of sentencing at the relinquishment hearing. See id. 
6 The State actually implicitly admits that its argument to the contrary is untenable: 
"[State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 474 (1977)] demonstrates that when a sentence of 
retained jurisdiction is pronounced, such pronouncement constitutes the 'imposition' of 
sentence . ... " (Resp. Br., p.16.) 
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other option was to reduce that already-imposed sentence. Id.; State v. Mendenhalf, 
106 Idaho 388, 395 (Ct. App. 1984) (the district court's authority is limited to corrections 
of the sentence that do not increase the penalty imposed); State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 
664, 668 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying the Mendenhalf rule to prohibit subsequently 
increasing the aggregate penalty enforced against that defendant).7 Therefore, the 
State's assertion that the district court is allowed to reserve part of the sentencing until 
the relinquishment hearing, which could only serve to increase the penalty imposed at 
the sentencing hearing, is flatly and directly contradicted by precedent: if a penalty was 
not already imposed, the district court does not have the jurisdictional authority to add it 
in at the relinquishment hearing. See, e.g., Mendenhalf' 106 Idaho at 395. As such, 
those inappropriate and additional penalties should be vacated. See Bosier, 149 Idaho 
at 668. 
In this case, the district court imposed Mr. Steelsmith's sentence at the 
sentencing hearing. It explicitly excluded fines, costs, or a driver's license suspension. 
(See R., p.62.) The idea that each of these is a separate aspect of sentencing or 
sentencing ruling, each of which is imposed separately is palpably absurd, particularly in 
light of Coassolo, Alvarado, Goodlett, et al. which clearly hold to the contrary (the district 
7 The language in Mendenhalf is particularly telling in this regard. The Court of Appeals 
referred to increasing the "aggregate penalty," which suggests that an overall increase 
in the quantity of the punishment imposed exceeds the district court's jurisdiction. 
See Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395; see also Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668 (applying the 
Mendenhal! rule to prohibit increasing the aggregate penalty by altering a sentence so 
that it would run consecutively instead of concurrently). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically recognized that fines and license suspensions constitute punishments at 
sentencing. State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72 (2005). As such, adding them 
onto an already-imposed sentence at the relinquishment hearing impermissibly 
increases the aggregate penalty. See Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395; Bosier, 149 Idaho 
at 688. 
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court only has jurisdiction to impose a sentence before the period of retained jurisdiction 
begins, the entirety of which sentence may only subsequently be resumed at 
relinquishment or reduced pursuant to Rule 35). See, e.g., Coass%, 136 Idaho at 
142-43; Good/ett, 139 Idaho at 264. 
Finally, exemplifying the State's disregard for precedent with this argument, the 
Court of Appeals has considered a district court's attempt to reserve an aspect of 
sentencing until after the period of retained jurisdiction and found such an action to be in 
error. State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265, 269-70 (Ct. App. 2007). In Banbury, the district 
court did not order a necessary psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, but 
instead, ordered that evaluation to occur during the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
impact of which would be considered at the end of the period for retained jurisdiction. 
See id. at 267-68. The Court of Appeals held that the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522 (one of 
the aspects of sentencing a defendant with a mental health condition) required the 
district court to order that evaluation prior to its initial imposition of sentence so as to 
assure that information would factor into the imposed sentence. See id. at 269. This is 
true even though the district court expected to revisit the sentence after the period of 
retained jurisdiction. /d. The critical fact was that the evaluation was necessary to 
inform the sentencing decision, a decision which could not be properly rendered at 
some time after the imposition of the sentence. See id. at 268. As such, delaying 
aspects of the sentencing decision or some of the sentencing rulings until after the 
period of retained jurisdiction is impermissible. See id. at 268-69; Coass%, 136 Idaho 
at 142-43. 
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As the district court was only authorized to impose a sentence, which includes all 
components and aspects thereof, before the period of retained jurisdiction began, which 
it did, its decision to impose the additions of the fine, costs, and suspension was beyond 
its jurisdictional authority and therefore, those punishments should be vacated. See, 
e.g., Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668. 
2. As Established In Precedent, Mr. Steelsmith's Entire And Final Sentence Was 
Executed When He Was Remanded To The Custody Of The County Sheriff 
Further demonstrating why the subsequently-imposed punishments should be 
vacated, the imposed sentence (without the fine, costs, and suspension) was also 
executed. As recently as 2010, the Idaho appellate courts have held that once the 
defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of Correction, his sentence 
has been executed. State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939, 940 (1992); State v. Williams, 
126 Idaho 39, 44 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812-13 (Ct. App. 
2010). And, as the Williams Court explained, 
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) superimposes upon this division of jurisdiction 
between the courts and the Board a means by which a court may retain 
jurisdiction even after the defendant is in the physical custody of the 
Board. By allowing the court to retain jurisdiction for 180 days after the 
execution of a sentence has been ordered, Section 19-2601 (4) creates an 
exception to the general rule that the court loses jurisdiction from the 
moment execution of the sentence begins. The statute enables the court 
and the Board essentially to exercise concurrent authority over the 
offender for a limited period. 
Williams, 126 Idaho at 44 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals clearly stated, in 
the situation of retained jurisdiction, the sentence is executed, but the district court is 
permitted to retain limited jurisdiction (concurrent to that of the board). Id. The board is 
not authorized to increase the length of a defendant's sentence. See, e.g., 
12 
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 391 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Prout, 86 P. 275, 276 
(Idaho 1906) for its discussion of the separation of powers, specifically in regard to the 
powers of the board of pardons).8 
To hold otherwise and allow the district court to increase the amount of 
punishment after executing the sentence would permit the Judiciary to usurp a power 
reserved specifically to the Executive branch by the Idaho Constitution, specifically, 
control over a convicted and sentenced person. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163 
(2010), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895 (2011); State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 30,31-32 (2005); State v. 
Chapman, 121 Idaho 355 (1992). Therefore, the result of this dual jurisdiction is that 
the district court's continuing jurisdiction is necessarily limited. Id. As explained in 
Section 1(8)(1), infra, this limited grant of authority only permits the district courts to 
resume the original sentence or reduce it pursuant to Rule 35 when it relinquishes 
jurisdiction. Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264. Thus, in order 
for the coextensive jurisdiction to function within Idaho's constitutional framework, 
the sentence must be executed prior to the period of retained jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Williams, 126 Idaho at 44. This is consistent with the long-standing principles of Idaho 
law: "The Pedraza principle [that courts may not increase a previously imposed and 
suspended sentence upon a violation of probation] ... narrows the range of corrective 
sentences to those which will not increase the aggregate penalty imposed." 
8 "Whenever such [80ard of Pardons] undertakes to increase or extend the penalty or 
punishment imposed upon a convict by a decree of court, they at once pass beyond the 
realm of their jurisdiction and authority .... " Prout, 86 P. at 276. 
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Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395 (citing State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440 (1980)). As such, 
the State's assertion, that the sentence had not been executed, is without merit. 
Such a conclusion is also consistent with the statutory language governing 
periods of retained jurisdiction, which clearly indicates that the sentence must be 
executed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. See I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The 
Legislature provided: "The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if 
not affirmatively placed on probation by the court." Id. (emphasis added); see Taylor, 
142 Idaho at 31-32; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812. Because the language specifically 
denotes that the person "remains committed to the board," that person must have been 
initially committed to the board. 9 See id. (emphasis added). And since the person must 
have been initially committed to the board before the period of retained jurisdiction 
began, the sentence must have been executed at that time. McGonigal, 122 Idaho at 
940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this principle, that when the 
district court retains jurisdiction, "[a] defendant's sentence begins when it is imposed by 
the court. I.C. § 20-209A ... [T]he 180-day period of retained jurisdiction begins to run 
once the sentence is pronounced, regardless of whether the defendant is transported to 
the Board immediately or there is some delay." Petersen, 149 Idaho at 813. The only 
way such calculations of time frames (i.e., the time for the district court to suspend the 
sentence or for the defendant to file an appeal) can permissibly begin from the date of 
imposition is if the sentence is also executed at that same time. See id. And while the 
9 The statute is clear and unambiguous in this regard, and so this Court must give effect 
to that unambiguous language, regardless of whether it approves of the outcome. 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-95. 
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execution may be effectuated at the point of relinquishment (see Resp. Br., p.10), that 
does not change the fact that the execution initially occurred upon remand of custody to 
the board. Compare State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472,474 (1977), with McGonigal, 122 
Idaho at 940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13.10 Rather, the 
commitment which occurs when the district court relinquishes jurisdiction is properly 
qualified as the "final commitment to the State Board of Corrections." See 
State v. Schrom, 105 Idaho 769, 772 (1983). To be qualified as a "final commitment," 
there must necessarily have been an "initial commitment." See id. That initial 
commitment occurs at the sentencing hearing and constitutes the execution of the 
sentence. See, e.g., Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. 
When, as here, the district court is permitted to retain some limited jurisdiction, 
that jurisdiction "did not extend to take other actions, such as enlarging the sentence 
after the original judgment of conviction and sentence had become final." See Bosier, 
149 Idaho at 667. Both the Legislature and the appellate courts have made it clear that 
execution of the sentence in a retained jurisdiction situation occurs before the period of 
retained jurisdiction begins. I.C. § 19-2601(4); I.C. § 20-209A; McGonigal, 122 Idaho at 
940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. They have also made it 
clear that any continuing jurisdiction over the sentence is limited to only resuming that 
10 It is also important to note that the law in this regard evolved away from the position 
articulated in Ditmars in 1977. See McGonigal, 122 Idaho at 940 (decided in 1992): 
Williams, 126 Idaho at 44 (decided in 1994); Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13 (decided in 
2010). Similarly, the Legislature amended I.C. 19-2601 (4) in 1995 to provide that "the 
prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on 
probation by the court." 1995 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 247 (emphasis added). As 
such, the more accurate statement of the law regarding the execution of the sentence is 
that articulated by Mr. Steelsmith. 
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which was already imposed or reducing that which was already imposed. Coassolo, 
136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
In Mr. Steelsmith's case, the district court explicitly, both in its written order and 
in its oral pronouncement, executed the sentence: ''The defendant shall be remanded 
to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, to be delivered FORTHWITH by him into the 
custody of the State of Idaho Board of Correction." (R., p.63 (emphasis in original); 
see Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.1.) Because Mr. Steelsmith's entire sentence was executed 
before the period of retained jurisdiction began, the district court was without jurisdiction 
to add new punishments or otherwise increase that sentence when it relinquished that 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. Its 
limited statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction would have allowed it, at most, to 
continue the originally-imposed-and-executed sentence (which did not include any fines, 
costs, or license suspension). See, e.g., Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 
Idaho at 264. By going beyond that limited jurisdiction, the district court erred and those 
punishments added to the sentence without jurisdiction should be vacated. See 
McFarland, 79 Idaho at 266; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 667. 
C. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error Because The Imposition Of The 
New Punishments Violated Mr. Steelsmith's Unwaived Federal And State 
Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy 
By imposing multiple punishments for the same offense, the record clearly 
demonstrates that, in addition to exceeding its jurisdictional authority, the district court 
also clearly violated Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived federal and state constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy, and in doing so, affected the outcome of the 
proceedings by increasing his sentence. (See App. Br., pp.12-17.) As such, this Court 
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may consider this argument on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
Imposing multiple punishments at a second, subsequent proceeding, even if authorized 
by the Legislature, violates the double jeopardy protections. State v. A velar, 132 Idaho 
775, 778 (1999). The State responds with the odd and untenable argument that 
Mr. Steelsmith had no legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence imposed at the 
sentencing hearing, and so was not originally in jeopardy. (See Resp. 8r., pp.13-15.) 
This position is directly contrary to explicit Idaho law, as set forth by the Legislature and 
reinforced by judicial precedent, and should, therefore, be rejected. 
First and foremost, in a guilty plea context, jeopardy attaches when the 
defendant pleads guilty. State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 896 (1985). As such, the 
minute Mr. Steelsmith' guilty plea was entered and accepted by the district court, the 
jeopardy protections attached to his case. See id. Therefore, the State's argument that 
jeopardy did not attach to the original sentence (Resp. 8r., p.21 ("Accordingly, under 
DiFrancesco,11 former jeopardy did not attach to [Mr.] Steelsmith's sentence in regard 
to those matters before the rider review hearing .... ") is meritless. Jeopardy had 
attached to these proceedings upon the entry of the guilty plea. Alanis, 109 Idaho at 
896. 
The State's only other argument is that the sentence was not final, in that 
Mr. Steelsmith had no legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence, and therefore, 
could not been placed in double jeopardy. This position, too, is meritless. For the same 
reason the sentence must be executed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins, 
(see Section 1(8)(2), supra), that sentence must also be final, or at least provide a 
11 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980). 
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legitimate expectation of finality therein: ''The prisoner will remain committed to the 
board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court." Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Taylor, 142 Idaho at 31-32 (recognizing the same); Petersen, 149 
Idaho at 812 (recognizing the same). The board has no authority to increase that term 
of commitment. Prout, 86 P. at 276; see Creech, 105 Idaho at 391. Similarly, the 
district court, at most, may only resume the originally-imposed judgment, not increase it. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668. 
Since the default result at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction is that the 
originally-imposed and executed sentence is continued (as opposed to initiated), that 
sentence must necessarily be reliably final. And since that person remains committed 
pursuant to the original judgment, his appeal of his sentence is necessarily against the 
original Judgment of Conviction. See, e.g., State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 783-84 
(2010). As such, the sentence imposed therein must possess the necessary finality to 
constitute an appealable order. I.A.R. 11 (c)(1); see I.A.R. 14. Therefore, the defendant 
has, at least, a legitimate expectation in the finality of that sentence because he knows 
that it will be the sentence he must serve if no further action is taken by the district 
court, he knows that sentence cannot be increased, and he knows that he can 
challenge the propriety of the sentence on appeal. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; 
Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668; Longest, 149 Idaho at 783-84; 
I.A.R. 11 (c)(1); I.A.R. 14. 
Furthermore, the principle the State cites from DiFrancesco - that the defendant 
cannot have a legitimate expectation of finality in an originally-imposed sentence (Resp. 
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Br., pp.13-15) - does not undermine Mr. Steelsmith's argument, either because the 
principle is inapplicable to his claim or because he had the requisite expectation. 
First, the DiFrancesco principle was articulated in the specific situation where 
Congress expressly provided that sentences imposed pursuant to a particular statute 
could be increased on appeal. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136. As all parties were 
on notice that, by statutory authority, the imposed sentence was subject to increase, 
that sentence could not be relied upon as final until the appeal resolved. See 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136; compare, e.g., Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264 (holding that, 
in Idaho, the courts do not have the authority to increase a sentence once imposed). 
Therefore, the DiFrancesco rule is appropriately limited to situations where there is an 
express grant of power by the Legislature to effect an increase to an imposed sentence 
on appeal. 12 See id. The statutes under which Mr. Steelsmith was sentenced do not 
have such an express grant of authority. See I.C. §§ 18-8004, 8005(6). Therefore, the 
DiFrancesco rule is inapplicable to Mr. Steelsmith's case. 13 
12 However, based on the ruling in Avelar- that, in Idaho, new or additional punishments 
imposed at a second proceeding (which would include an appellate proceeding), even if 
authorized by the Legislature, violate the constitutional double jeopardy protections 
(Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778; see also Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264) - the rule from 
DiFrancesco is further limited to arguments made pursuant to the federal Constitution. 
13 As a result, the general rule - that a second or increased punishment for the same act 
violates the double jeopardy protections - governs whether Mr. Steelsmith's protections 
against double jeopardy were violated. See Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778; Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 703 (1980) (holding that "the Double Jeopardy Clause as 
interpreted by Ex parte Lange [85 U.S. 163 (1873)] prevents a sentencing court from 
increasing a defendant's sentence for any particular statutory offense, even though the 
second sentence is within the limits set by the [L]egislature" (emphasis added)). The 
addition of previously-unimposed punishments at the subsequent rider review hearing 
constitutes both a second punishment and an increase to the aggregate punishment, 
and thus, under the general rule, constitutes a violation of the protections against 
double jeopardy. 
19 
Second, even if the DiFrancesco rule is applicable to Mr. Steelsmith's case, he 
did have a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence. For example, the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized in Coassolo that the deprivation of liberty at the sentencing 
hearing was constitutionally permissible because the defendant had been afforded due 
process during that at that hearing. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43. However, it 
found that there was no due process right at the relinquishment stage of proceedings 
because the State was not effectuating a new liberty deprivation (i.e., depriving the 
defendant of more than it had originally deprived him of at the sentencing hearing). Id. 
at 143.14 In order for such a determination to pass constitutional muster, the initial 
deprivation must be reliably final. 
In addition to the indications of finality identified in Coassolo, Bosier, Longest, 
et a/.,15 judgments of conviction (which include sentencing orders) are final judgments 
14 However, in this case, the district court did not deprive Mr. Steelsmith of his liberty or 
property (the fines, costs, and suspension) when it was permitted to do so. (See R., 
pp.61-63.) Instead, it effectuated new deprivations when it relinquished jurisdiction (i.e., 
it took more than it had originally taken at the sentencing hearing). (Compare R., pp.61-
63 with R., pp.68-71.) 
This comparison also demonstrates the clear violation in the record itself, as well 
as the prejudice (the increased punishment) caused by the violation. As such, it 
demonstrates compliance with the second and third prongs of the Perry fundamental 
error test. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. There is no evidence in the record that 
Mr. Steelsmith ever waived his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. (See 
generally R.) Therefore, under Perry, Mr. Steelsmith only need demonstrate a violation 
of his constitutional protections against double jeopardy to meet all the prongs of that 
test. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As explained infra and supra, the district court's 
actions did, in fact, violate his rights to be free from double jeopardy, imposing a second 
and additional punishment for the same actions. See, e.g., Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. 
As a result, this Court has the authority to rule on the merits of this issue as 
fundamental error. See id. And since those new and additional penalties violate the 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy, this Court should vacate those 
penalties. 
15 The reasons why, in a case involving a period of retained jurisdiction, a sentence 
must be imposed and executed prior to the period of retained jurisdiction (as discussed 
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for purposes of appeal. State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Suspending a sentence for a period of probation does not affect the finality of the 
underlying judgment. Id. (also discussing the fact that, pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 14,16 the 
appeal period is enlarged by the period of retained jurisdiction, implying that retaining 
jurisdiction would not affect the finality of the judgment of conviction either). 
Accordingly, regardless of the outcome of the period of retained jurisdiction, a potential 
appeal is against the initially-imposed sentence contained in the original judgment of 
conviction. Id.; I.A.R. 14. As such, that initial judgment of conviction and the initially-
imposed sentence therein, must be reliably final. 
To that end, an order for the payment of fines and costs alone is considered a 
final judgment. State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 276 (1978). As such, the inverse 
should also be true - an order for only imprisonment (as was ordered in this case) is 
considered a final judgment. See id. Furthermore, even if the defendant had not 
challenged (or was unable to challenge) the initial punishment, he is not precluded from 
challenging the imposition of any additional punishments imposed after the judgment of 
conviction has been entered, including costs and fines. See id. (implying that, because 
each order constitutes a final, appealable order, the appealability of each order (and the 
in depth in Sections 1(8)(1 )-(2), supra), also, by inference, indicate that the sentence 
must be final. 
16 I.A.R. Rule 14 states: 
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in 
an action is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of 
the entry of judgment .... If, at the time of judgment, the district court 
retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4), the length of time 
to file an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment 
shall be enlarged by the length of time between entry of the judgment of 
conviction and entry of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the 
defendant on probation. 
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punishments contained therein) is determined separately, thus allowing a challenge to 
the additional punishments even without a challenge to the initial imposition of 
sanctions). In fact, the only distinguishable order is a withheld judgment because, in 
that situation, no sentence is imposed. 
As such, the initially-imposed sentence must have the necessary finality (i.e., the 
defendant's expectation of finality in that sentence is legitimate) to be appealable. 
Therefore, as Mr. Steelsmith would be allowed to challenge the sentence imposed in his 
judgment of conviction on appeal, he must necessarily have a legitimate expectation in 
the finality of that sentence. 
Therefore, these new punishments, imposed at a second proceeding, violated 
Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived state and federal constitutional protections against double 
jeopardy. Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. This violation constitutes fundamental error, and 
thus, this Court may address this issue on appeal and provide the appropriate remedy 
to Mr. Steelsmith. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the district court imposed the additional penalties of the fine, costs, and 
license suspension without jurisdiction to do so, and in violation of the constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy, Mr. Steelsmith respectfully requests this Court 
vacate those penalties. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2012. 
L/0L-
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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